CAGE OF CONTROL
Controlling the Narrative

United Kingdom

A regulator over search and social media, secret notices to break encryption, a compulsory licence fee, and laws that decide what appears first on your TV.

Introduction

Britain likes to think of itself as the home of a free press, and in print it largely still is. But online and in broadcasting, the British state has built more machinery for shaping what people find, say and see than almost any other democracy. Search engines and social networks answer to Ofcom under the Online Safety Act. Adults are asked to prove their age to reach large parts of the internet. The Investigatory Powers Act lets ministers serve secret notices on technology companies, including, according to court filings and press reports, one aimed at Apple's encryption. Police arrest thousands of people a year over online messages. And the BBC is funded by a fee that is a criminal offence to evade. In my view, that is a narrative built by design.

Control of Expression, Speech & Information

1. Internet searches: how the government controls them

Under the Online Safety Act 2023, search services are regulated in their own right. Section 29 imposes illegal content duties on search services: they must assess the risk of users encountering illegal content in search results and take proportionate measures to minimise it.[1] Ofcom's Illegal Content Codes of Practice for search services set out how: risk assessments, search moderation, reporting and complaints tools, and published statements of how the service handles illegal content.[2] Search services likely to be accessed by children also carry children's safety duties.[3] Breaches can draw fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.[4] A regulator now sets the rules for what the country's search results must suppress.

Site blocking is already routine. Under section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, courts order the major internet providers to block piracy sites. Open Rights Group, a digital rights group, has reported that ISPs administered about 2,500 domain-blocking injunctions in 2018, and its Blocked! tracker lists court-ordered blocks.[5][6] In May 2026 the High Court granted an "omnibus" order allowing six major ISPs to block qualifying piracy domains and mirrors without fresh applications for each one.[7] Separately, the Internet Watch Foundation supplies ISPs with a list of child sexual abuse URLs to filter.[8] Nobody defends child abuse material. My concern is the habit: once blocking infrastructure exists and courts approve self-updating orders, the question becomes only what else to put on the list.

Right to be forgotten. UK courts apply the de-listing right developed in EU law. In NT1 and NT2 v Google (2018), the High Court ordered Google to de-list results about one businessman's old conviction and refused for another.[9]

Government removal requests. In January–June 2025, UK authorities sent Google 818 removal requests covering 28,673 items, 576 of them aimed at Web Search. "Regulated goods and services" was the top reason (500 requests), and police made 83 of the requests, government officials 77.[10] In the previous six months there were 604 requests covering 55,513 items.[10]

2. Social media searches and removals

The Online Safety Act gives Ofcom powers over social media too, backed by the same 10% maximum fine.[4] Platforms must assess and mitigate the risk of illegal content. Under the Protection of Children Codes, in force since 25 July 2025, services whose recommender systems pose a medium or high risk must exclude the most serious categories of harmful content from children's feeds, and exclude or reduce the prominence of other harmful content.[3] Protecting children is a legitimate aim. My concern is precedent: the state now has a legal hook into how platforms rank and display content.

Inside government, there was the Counter Disinformation Unit, created in 2020. According to Big Brother Watch, it monitored lawful online criticism of government policy, including posts by MPs, journalists and academics, and passed content to platforms with recommendations for removal.[11] It was later rebranded the National Security Online Information Team (NSOIT). Big Brother Watch says ministers have refused to give a full list of the topics it monitors,[12] and that government flagging of posts to platforms fell by 95% after its investigation was published.[13] To me, that drop is telling: if the flagging was essential, it would not have collapsed the moment the public found out.

Removal is the soft end. The hard end is arrest. In April 2025, The Times reported freedom-of-information data showing that police in England and Wales made 12,183 arrests in 2023 under section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 and the Malicious Communications Act 1988, up from 7,734 in 2019. Not every force answered.[14] Those laws cover menacing messages as well as "grossly offensive" ones, so not every arrest was over an opinion. But in my view the arrest is itself the punishment, whatever happens afterwards.

What platforms report: Meta restricted access to 6,318 items in the UK based on local law in July–December 2025.[15] [Needs source: X's UK government removal request figures.]

3. Social media access and ID

Since 25 July 2025, services that allow pornography or other "primary priority" harmful content must use "highly effective age assurance" to keep children out.[3] In practice, millions of adults are now asked to prove their age, with ID, a bank check or a face scan, to reach large parts of the internet. Britain has no statutory minimum age for social media accounts. [Needs source: status of any UK proposal for an under-16 social media restriction.]

Then digital ID. On 26 September 2025, the Prime Minister announced a national digital ID that would be "mandatory for Right to Work checks by the end of the Parliament." It would hold name, date of birth, nationality or residency status, and a photo.[16] Public support collapsed; nearly three million people signed a parliamentary petition against it. On 13 January 2026 the government dropped the requirement that workers sign up, while staying committed to mandatory digital right-to-work checks.[17] The scheme is expected to rest on GOV.UK One Login and a GOV.UK Wallet.[17] I count the climbdown as a win for the public. But the infrastructure is still being built.

4. Social media warrants, known or unknown to the user

Technical capability notices. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 lets the Home Secretary issue technical capability notices requiring a company to maintain the ability to provide assistance, which can include obligations to remove "electronic protection" a company has applied to communications or data.[18] A person served with one must not disclose its existence or contents without the Home Secretary's permission.[19] In early 2025 the government reportedly served Apple with a notice seeking access to encrypted iCloud data. Apple withdrew its Advanced Data Protection feature for new UK users rather than comply.[20][21] Court documents later shed more light on the dispute, and the feature remains unavailable to new UK users.[21][22] We know about this case only because it leaked. By design, we would not know about others.

Secrecy of warrants. It is an offence to disclose the existence of an interception warrant.[23] There is no general duty to tell people they were surveilled.

Scale. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner reports that in 2024 it authorised over 300,000 applications and warrants. Applications for communications data rose 31.5% between 2020 and the end of 2024.[24]

What platforms report. In July–December 2025, Meta received 12,416 UK requests for user data (12,292 legal process, 124 emergency) covering 16,002 accounts, and produced some data in 84.79% of them.[25] Google received 14,502 legal requests (90% disclosed, covering 18,741 accounts), 968 emergency requests, and 67 orders under the UK–US data access agreement.[26]

5. Government-controlled media: print

The UK press is not licensed by the state, and that matters. After the Leveson Inquiry, Parliament passed the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Its section 40 would have made publishers outside an officially recognised regulator liable for both sides' legal costs in many cases, even when they won. It was never brought into force, and the Media Act 2024 repealed it.[27][28] Most major newspapers belong to IPSO, an industry regulator that never sought official recognition. [Needs source: IPSO membership and status.] The episode shows the instinct: when the press misbehaved, the first proposal was a costs penalty for refusing to join a state-approved regulator. [Needs source: UK government advertising spend in print.]

6. Government-controlled media: television and radio

Funding. It is a criminal offence under section 363 of the Communications Act 2003 to watch or record live TV, or use BBC iPlayer, without a licence. The maximum fine is £1,000.[29][30] The fee is set by the government and collected by the BBC.[31] It rose to £174.50 in April 2025, and the BBC collected £3.879 billion in licence fee income in 2025/26.[32]

Governance. The BBC operates under a Royal Charter running to 31 December 2027, renegotiated with ministers every decade.[33][34] The government's Green Paper says licence fee income fell by more than 30% in real terms over the past decade.[34] An institution whose constitution and income depend on periodic agreement with ministers is structurally tied to the state, however independent its journalists may be. [Needs source: Charter provisions on government appointment of the BBC chair and board members.]

Prominence. The Media Act 2024 requires major connected-TV platforms (smart TVs, set-top boxes, streaming sticks) to carry designated public service broadcaster apps and give them prominence. BBC iPlayer is designated automatically, and Ofcom has drafted a code of practice.[35][36] The law now decides which channels appear first when you switch on your television.

Radio. BBC radio is funded from the same licence fee. In 2025/26 the BBC also received £137 million from the Foreign Office for the World Service.[32] The Media Act extends protections to UK radio on "radio selection services," including voice-activated smart speakers.[28]

My view

Britain has kept its newspapers free, and credit goes to the people who fought for that. Everything else is managed. A regulator writes the rules for search and social feeds. Adults show ID to browse. The government can serve secret orders to weaken encryption. Police arrest thousands over messages each year. Broadcasting is funded under threat of a criminal fine and guaranteed prominence by statute. In my view, that is a narrative managed from Whitehall.

Sources

  1. Online Safety Act 2023, section 29 (illegal content duties for search services) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/section/29
  2. Ofcom, Illegal content Codes of Practice for search services — https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/online-safety/information-for-industry/illegal-harms/illegal-content-codes-of-practice-for-search-services-24-feb.pdf
  3. Ofcom, "New rules for a safer generation of children online" — https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/protecting-children/new-rules-for-a-safer-generation-of-children-online
  4. Ofcom, "What happens when a company doesn't pay a fine" — https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/what-happens-when-a-company-doesnt-pay-a-fine
  5. Open Rights Group, "Victory on Supreme Court web blocking judgement" — https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/victory-on-supreme-court-web-blocking-judgement/
  6. Blocked! (Open Rights Group), "Legal blocks" — https://www.blocked.org.uk/legal-blocks/sites
  7. High Court order, Columbia Pictures v BT (7 May 2026) — https://torrentfreak.com/images/IL-2025-000240_Columbia_Pictures_v_BT_PUBLIC_Order_07.05.2026.pdf
  8. Internet Watch Foundation, URL List policy and blocking good practice — https://www.iwf.org.uk/our-technology/our-services/url-list/url-list-policy-and-blocking-good-practice
  9. NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC, EWHC 799 (QB), 2018 — https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2018/799.html
  10. Google Transparency Report, Government requests to remove content (data download, Jul 2024–Jun 2025) — https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/overview
  11. Big Brother Watch, "Inside Whitehall's Ministry of Truth" — https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/press-releases/inside-whitehalls-ministry-of-truth-how-secretive-anti-misinformation-teams-conducted-mass-political-monitoring/
  12. Big Brother Watch, NSOIT briefing (Nov 2024) — https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/BigBrotherWatch-Briefing-on-the-National-Security-Online-Information-Team.pdf
  13. Big Brother Watch, "Government's secret counter-disinformation policies revealed" — https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/blog/governments-secret-counter-disinformation-policies-revealed/
  14. Reclaim The Net, "UK Arrests for 'Offensive' Online Posts Nearly Double in Seven Years" (9 Apr 2025, reporting The Times' FOI data) — https://reclaimthenet.org/uk-arrests-for-offensive-online-posts-nearly-double-in-seven-years
  15. Meta Transparency Center, Content restrictions based on local law: United Kingdom (Jul–Dec 2025 data file) — https://transparency.meta.com/reports/content-restrictions/country/GB/
  16. GOV.UK, "New digital ID scheme to be rolled out across UK" (26 Sep 2025) — https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-digital-id-scheme-to-be-rolled-out-across-uk
  17. BBC News, "Government drops plans for mandatory digital ID to work in UK" (13 Jan 2026) — https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3385zrrx73o
  18. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 253 (technical capability notices) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/section/253
  19. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 255(8) (non-disclosure of notices) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/section/255
  20. BBC News, "Apple pulls data protection tool after UK government security row" — https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo
  21. BBC News, "Court documents shed new light on UK-Apple row over user data" — https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx293qg7z39o
  22. Apple Support, "Apple can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection in the United Kingdom to new users" — https://support.apple.com/en-ca/122234
  23. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 57 (duty not to make unauthorised disclosures) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/section/57
  24. Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office, Annual Report 2024 — https://ipco-wpmedia-prod-s3.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/IPCO-Annual-Report-2024.pdf
  25. Meta Transparency Center, Government requests for user data: United Kingdom (Jul–Dec 2025) — https://transparency.meta.com/reports/government-data-requests/country/GB/
  26. Google Transparency Report, Global requests for user information (data download, period ending 31 Dec 2025) — https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview
  27. Media Act 2024, Explanatory Notes — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20240015_en.pdf
  28. Media Act 2024, section 50 — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/15/section/50
  29. Communications Act 2003, Part 4 (s.363) — https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/part/4/enacted
  30. GOV.UK, "TV Licence" — https://www.gov.uk/find-licences/tv-licence
  31. TV Licensing, "Legal framework" — https://www.tvlicensing.co.uk/about/foi-legal-framework-AB16
  32. BBC Annual Report 2025/26, "Our finances" — https://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/annualreport2025-2026/our-finances/
  33. GOV.UK, BBC Charter and Framework Agreement — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bbc-charter-and-framework-agreement
  34. GOV.UK, BBC Royal Charter Review Green Paper — https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/britains-story-the-next-chapter-the-bbc-royal-charter-review-green-paper-and-public-consultation/britains-story-the-next-chapter-bbc-royal-charter-review-green-paper-and-public-consultation
  35. GOV.UK, "Prominence – specifying internet television equipment: a policy statement" — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prominence-specifying-internet-television-equipment-a-policy-statement/prominence-specifying-internet-television-equipment-a-policy-statement
  36. Ofcom, consultation on draft prominence Code of Practice for connected TV platforms — https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/digital-tv/prominence-and-accessibility-on-connected-tv-platforms-consultation-on-our-draft-code-of-practice-and-draft-guidance-on-the-agreement-objectives

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