CAGE OF CONTROL
Controlling the Narrative

Germany

Delisting rules, DNS blocks, €50 million fines, state trojans, a household levy, and laws about what you see first.

Introduction

Germany has a strong constitutional guarantee of press freedom, and its history gives it good reasons to distrust state propaganda. But the modern German state has built some of the most detailed rules in the democratic world for what may be found, said and seen online. Internet providers block websites through a joint industry body. A platform law with fines of up to €50 million pushed social networks to remove content fast, and state-approved "trusted flaggers" now jump the queue. Police and prosecutors send Meta more user-data requests than any other country in this series. Courts authorise state hacking of phones. A compulsory levy funds the public broadcasters, and a media treaty guarantees them the first screen of your TV. In my view, Germany controls the narrative less by censorship than by architecture.

Control of Expression, Speech & Information

1. Internet searches: how the government controls them

Most of the formal rules for search now come from Brussels. On 25 April 2023, the European Commission designated Google Search and Bing as "very large online search engines" under the Digital Services Act. That obliges them to assess "systemic risks" at least once a year, including risks to civic discourse, public security and minors, and to take mitigation measures, submit to independent audits and report to regulators.[1][2] A risk-mitigation duty defined by regulators is, in practice, a duty to shape what ranks.

Germany adds its own layers. On the "right to be forgotten," the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in November 2019 that online press archives can be required to protect old, name-identifying reports from appearing in name searches, without deleting them. In a companion case it held that, against a search engine, a person's privacy rights must be weighed against the publisher's freedom of expression and the public's interest in information.[3][4]

Website blocking. Since 2021 Germany's main internet providers and rights holders have run a joint body, the Clearingstelle Urheberrecht im Internet (CUII), to impose DNS blocks on "structurally copyright-infringing" websites. Following a 2025 reform, blocks are set up after a court has ordered them; the CUII then asks participating providers to implement the DNS block.[5] Youth-protection regulators block too. In 2022 the Commission for the Protection of Minors in the Media (KJM) ordered the blocking of the pornography site xHamster in Germany because it had no effective age verification. When action against the operator and host failed, the five largest German access providers were required to impose a DNS block.[6]

Government removal requests. In January–June 2025, German authorities sent Google 638 removal requests covering 2,333 items, 186 of them aimed at Web Search. Defamation was the top reason (340 requests), followed by "other" and regulated goods; 42 cited hate speech. Police made 113 requests, and courts issued 98 orders directed at Google.[7]

2. Social media searches and removals

Germany was the pioneer. The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), in force since 2017, required large social networks to remove "manifestly unlawful" content within 24 hours of a complaint, with fines for violations of up to €50 million.[8] In 2023 the Federal Office of Justice fined Telegram €5.125 million for failing to provide a legally compliant complaints channel and a contact person in Germany.[9] The EU's Digital Services Act now largely governs this space, but NetzDG set the template Brussels later followed.

Trusted flaggers. Under the DSA, the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) approves "trusted flaggers," organisations whose reports platforms must prioritise. The first was approved in 2024: REspect!, a reporting office for online hate.[10] When the agency's president suggested illegal content would be removed quickly, critics warned of censorship, and the agency publicly rejected that reading.[11] In 2025 politicians and lawyers raised concerns that trusted flaggers could curb free speech.[12] The legal line is supposed to be illegality. But organisations with an activist mission now have a privileged channel to the platforms, and the state chose them.

Police action. In November 2024 police searched the home of a 64-year-old Bavarian pensioner and seized his tablet over a shared meme calling then-minister Robert Habeck a "Schwachkopf" ("moron"). The insult investigation was later provisionally dropped, and he was eventually fined €825 for four other reshared posts containing Nazi-era symbols.[13][14] Whatever you think of the other posts, police searching a home over a meme insulting a minister is hard to reconcile with a free society.

What platforms report. Meta restricted access to 2,964 items in Germany based on local law in July–December 2025.[15] [Needs source: German figures from X's transparency report.]

3. Social media access and ID

Germany has no statutory social media age limit yet, but one is coming. An expert commission on child protection in the digital world delivered its final report on 11 September 2026 with 56 recommendations.[16] On 14 October 2026 the federal government adopted key points: it will push in the EU's "KIDS Act" negotiations for children under 13 to have no access to social networks, and until an EU minimum age exists it wants a national interim rule banning under-13s, with graduated restrictions for 13- to 18-year-olds. Algorithmic recommendations are to be switched off by default.[17]

The enforcement tool is a state wallet. From 2027, the government says, Germany's version of the EU digital identity wallet, "d-you," will provide age verification to digital services.[17] So the route to an age-limited internet runs through a government-issued digital ID.

On real names, the Federal Court of Justice ruled in January 2022 that Facebook could not force users who had signed up before May 2018 to use their real names publicly, though it could require the real name internally at registration.[18] Pseudonymity survives, but only partly.

4. Social media warrants, known or unknown to the user

Interception. According to the Federal Office of Justice, telecommunications surveillance under §100a of the Code of Criminal Procedure was ordered in 5,538 proceedings in 2024, up 11.4%, with 16,868 orders in total.[19]

The state trojan. "Source" interception, in which police install software on a suspect's device to read communications before encryption, was ordered 97 times in 2024 and carried out 64 times. Covert "online searches" of entire devices under §100b were ordered in 16 proceedings and carried out in 15.[19] In June 2025 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that source interception is void insofar as it covers offences punishable by up to three years in prison. The court found the online-search power breached a procedural requirement of the Basic Law, but left it in force until it is redrafted.[20][21]

Metadata. Traffic data requests under §100g were ordered in 22,749 proceedings in 2024, with 34,663 orders in total. Requests for usage data from online services under §100k produced 319 orders in 254 proceedings, up nearly 30%.[19]

Notification. German law does require that people subject to these measures be notified afterwards, but notification can be postponed while it would endanger the investigation.[22] [Needs source: statistics on how often notification is deferred or never given.]

What platforms report. In July–December 2025, Meta received 26,981 German requests for user data (25,676 legal process, 1,305 emergency) covering 44,533 accounts, and produced some data in 77.38% of cases.[23] Google received 44,792 legal requests (88% disclosed, covering 63,462 accounts) and 690 emergency requests.[24] Germany sent Google roughly three times as many legal requests as the UK.[24]

5. Government-controlled media: print

German newspapers are privately owned and not licensed. The federal government's most visible financial relationship with them is advertising. According to its answer to a parliamentary question, it spent about €88.7 million on media placement for advertising and information campaigns in 2024. That figure covers all media and excludes agency and creative costs.[25] [Needs source: breakdown of print advertising.] Government advertising is discretionary, and the government chooses where it goes. Citizens should be able to see which outlets receive it.

6. Government-controlled media: television and radio

Funding. ARD and ZDF are funded by the Rundfunkbeitrag, a compulsory fee of €18.36 a month per household, whether or not anyone in it watches public broadcasting. In 2024 it raised about €8.74 billion, of which €8.57 billion went to ARD, ZDF and Deutschlandradio.[26]

Governance. In 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court found that ZDF's supervisory boards had too many politicians on them. It ruled that the share of state and state-affiliated members on its television and administrative councils must be capped at one third, and that the executive must not decide who fills the non-state seats.[27] That a court had to impose the cap tells you how close the politicians had come.

Prominence. The Interstate Media Treaty adds a findability lever. Under §84, public broadcasting services and private services that the state media authorities designate as having "public value" must be easy to find on the first selection level of user interfaces such as smart TVs. Designations last three years.[28] Under §94, intermediaries such as search engines and social networks must not systematically discriminate against journalistic-editorial content, enforced by the state media authorities.[29]

Radio. Deutschlandradio and the ARD regional radio stations are funded from the same levy,[26] and the §84 findability rules also cover radio and audio in user interfaces.[28]

My view

Germany has built a system that sounds technocratic and neutral: risk assessments, DNS blocks, non-discrimination duties, trusted flaggers, compliance fines, age checks through a state wallet. Each piece has a legal justification. Together, they mean the state shapes what is findable, approves who flags content for removal, requests user data at an extraordinary rate, hacks phones under court order, prosecutes citizens for insulting ministers, and funds and promotes the dominant broadcasters. In my opinion, that is control by architecture, and it is no less control for being polite.

Sources

  1. European Commission, "Digital Services Act: Commission designates first set of Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines" (25 Apr 2023) — https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2413
  2. European Commission, "DSA: Very large online platforms and search engines" — https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops
  3. Bundesverfassungsgericht, press release on "Recht auf Vergessen I" (6 Nov 2019) — https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2019/bvg19-083.html
  4. Bundesverfassungsgericht, press release on "Recht auf Vergessen II" (6 Nov 2019) — https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2019/bvg19-084.html
  5. Clearingstelle Urheberrecht im Internet (CUII), FAQ — https://cuii.info/faq/
  6. Landesanstalt für Medien NRW, "KJM beschließt Sperrung von xHamster" (Mar 2022) — https://www.medienanstalt-nrw.de/presse/pressemitteilungen-2022/2022/maerz/kjm-beschliesst-sperrung-von-xhamster.html
  7. Google Transparency Report, Government requests to remove content (data download, Jan–Jun 2025) — https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/overview
  8. NetzDG §4 (fines provisions) — https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/__4.html
  9. Bundesamt für Justiz, press release on Telegram fine (2 Mar 2023) — https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/ServiceGSB/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/20230302.html
  10. Bundesnetzagentur, first Trusted Flagger approved (press release) — https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2024/20240927_DSC_TrustedFlagger.html?nn=659670
  11. Der Spiegel, "Bundesnetzagentur weist Berichte über Onlinezensur zurück" — https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/bundesnetzagentur-weist-berichte-ueber-online-zensur-zurueck-a-36ad6c31-f798-4e2d-9ce1-cf9910d8cc54
  12. Euronews, "German politicians and lawyers worry 'trusted flaggers' of online hate may curb freedom of speech" (5 Aug 2025) — https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/05/german-politicians-and-lawyers-worry-trusted-flaggers-of-online-hate-may-curb-freedom-of-s
  13. BR24, "Strafbare Bilder auf X: Mann aus Unterfranken verurteilt" — https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/strafbare-bilder-auf-x-mann-aus-unterfranken-verurteilt,UoTrFE1
  14. BR24, "'Schwachkopf'-Post und mehr: Strafbefehl gegen Unterfranken" — https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/schwachkopf-post-gegen-robert-habeck-und-mehr-strafbefehl-gegen-unterfranken,UiWqZKy
  15. Meta Transparency Center, Content restrictions based on local law: Germany (Jul–Dec 2025 data file) — https://transparency.meta.com/reports/content-restrictions/country/DE/
  16. BMBFSFJ, "56 Empfehlungen für einen zeitgemäßen Kinder- und Jugendschutz in der digitalen Welt" — https://www.bmbfsfj.bund.de/bmbfsfj/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/56-empfehlungen-fuer-einen-zeitgemaessen-kinder-und-jugendschutz-in-der-digitalen-welt-294124
  17. BMBFSFJ, "Bundesregierung beschließt Eckpunkte für besseren Kinder- und Jugendmedienschutz" (14 Oct 2026) — https://www.bmbfsfj.bund.de/bmbfsfj/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/bundesregierung-beschliesst-eckpunkte-fuer-besseren-kinder-und-jugendmedienschutz-298288
  18. Bundesgerichtshof, press release on real-name requirement (III ZR 3/21, 27 Jan 2022) — https://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2022/2022013.html
  19. Bundesamt für Justiz, "Statistiken zur Telekommunikationsüberwachung für das Jahr 2024 veröffentlicht" (26 Jun 2026) — https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/ServiceGSB/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/20260626.html
  20. Bundesverfassungsgericht, press release on source interception and online searches (2025) — https://bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2025/bvg25-069.html
  21. tagesschau.de, "Bundesverfassungsgericht schränkt Einsatz von 'Staatstrojaner' ein" — https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/urteil-bundesverfassungsgericht-staatstrojaner-100.html
  22. Strafprozessordnung §101 (notification of covert measures) — https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/__101.html
  23. Meta Transparency Center, Government requests for user data: Germany (Jul–Dec 2025) — https://transparency.meta.com/reports/government-data-requests/country/DE/
  24. Google Transparency Report, Global requests for user information (data download, period ending 31 Dec 2025) — https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview
  25. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/378 (government answer on information campaign spending) — https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/003/2100378.pdf
  26. Beitragsservice, Jahresbericht 2024 press release (5 Jun 2025) — https://www.rundfunkbeitrag.de/presse-und-aktuelles/presse/beitragsservice-stellt-jahresbericht-2024-vor-beitragsertraege-nach-sondereffekten-des-bundesweiten-meldedatenabgleichs-ruecklaeufig
  27. Bundesverfassungsgericht, "Normenkontrollanträge gegen den ZDF-Staatsvertrag überwiegend erfolgreich" (25 Mar 2014) — https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2014/bvg14-026.html
  28. Medienstaatsvertrag §84 (Auffindbarkeit) — https://www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/MStV-84
  29. Die Medienanstalten, "Medienintermediäre" (§94 non-discrimination) — https://www.die-medienanstalten.de/aufgaben/vielfaltssicherung/medienintermediaere/

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