CAGE OF CONTROL
Controlling the Narrative

Australia

A regulator for the internet, codes for search engines, warrants you never hear about, and a broadcaster on the public payroll.

Introduction

Australia has not banned newspapers or jailed broadcasters. What it has done, over roughly a decade, is put the state in the middle of almost every channel Australians use to find, share and receive information. It sets rules for what search engines show, can ask internet providers to block websites, decides who is old enough to hold a social media account, holds some of the broadest surveillance and decryption powers in the democratic world, and funds the largest broadcaster directly. Each step was sold as protection: for children, against crime, against "misinformation." Below I go through each part of the machinery in turn. In my view, the sum of those steps is a government that sits between its citizens and the information they receive.

Control of Expression, Speech & Information

1. Internet searches: how the government controls them

Search is where most people start, and Australia now regulates it directly. Under the Online Safety Act, industry bodies must write codes that the eSafety Commissioner registers and can enforce. The Internet Search Engine Services Online Safety Code for age-restricted material was registered in June 2025, and most of its obligations took effect on 27 December 2025.[1][2] Under it, pornographic and "high-impact violence" images in search results must be blurred by default for users who aren't logged in. By 27 June 2026, search engines must also apply "appropriate age assurance" to logged-in account holders, and set the highest safety filtering by default for anyone their systems judge likely to be an Australian child.[1][2] eSafety stresses that you can still search without logging in.[1] But the direction is clear: the full, unfiltered results page is becoming something you unlock by proving your age to a search company.

The government also has a direct blocking tool. Section 313(3) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 lets government agencies ask internet service providers to "disrupt" access to online services, which in practice means blocking websites.[3] Whole-of-government guidelines tell agencies to limit it to serious offences or national security threats, to show a stop page, and to report numbers each year to the media regulator ACMA.[4] In 2021–22, agencies reported 245 services blocked, all for "enforcing the criminal law and laws imposing pecuniary penalties."[5] The guidelines also let agencies withhold details of individual requests if disclosure might affect an investigation, giving ACMA only a total.[3] [Needs source: the most recent year's s313(3) totals.]

Then there are removal requests to the search companies themselves. In January–June 2025, Australian authorities sent Google 307 removal requests covering 684 items across its products, 41 of them aimed at Web Search. The biggest requester was the "Consumer Protection Authority" category (186 requests), and fraud was the top stated reason (165), followed by privacy and security (38) and defamation (22). Twelve requests came under court suppression orders.[6] In the previous six months, 100 of 284 Australian requests targeted Web Search.[6]

Australia has no general European-style "right to be forgotten." [Needs source: current status of the Privacy Act reform proposals on a right to erasure or de-indexing.]

2. Social media searches and removals

The center of gravity is the eSafety Commissioner. The Online Safety Act 2021 gives eSafety power to require content removed from a wide range of online services, under schemes covering cyberbullying of children, image-based abuse, adult cyber-abuse and seriously harmful "class 1" material.[7]

The power was tested in April 2024. After the stabbing of a religious leader at Wakeley in Sydney, eSafety issued a removal notice to X over footage of the attack and went to the Federal Court. It dropped the court case in June 2024 and moved the dispute to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal,[8] where it was settled by agreement in October 2024, with no ruling on the merits.[9] The lesson I take from it: an Australian official tried to set what could be seen on a global platform, and it took a company with deep pockets to push back.

Platforms' own reports show how much content is restricted under Australian law. Meta reports that in July–December 2025 it restricted access in Australia to 230,765 items on Facebook and Instagram based on local law, including 176,405 Facebook posts and 54,076 Instagram media items.[10] That is by far the highest figure of the six countries I examined; the next highest, the UK, was 6,318.[10] [Needs source: Meta's explanation of what drove the Australian total.]

Misinformation is handled through a "voluntary" industry code, administered by the industry group DIGI and overseen by ACMA, which reports to government on how platforms perform.[11] In 2024 the government tried to go further with the Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation Bill, which would have given ACMA formal powers over platforms. It was dropped in November 2024 because it had no path through the Senate.[12] It didn't fail because the government changed its mind. It failed because it ran out of votes, and ideas like that have a way of coming back. [Needs source: annual eSafety removal-notice volumes by scheme.]

3. Social media access and ID

Australia is the first democracy to ban children from social media outright. The Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act passed in November 2024.[13] Since 10 December 2025, age-restricted platforms have had to take "reasonable steps" to stop Australians under 16 from having accounts. Children and parents face no penalties; platforms do.[14] The maximum penalty is A$49.5 million,[15] and the BBC has reported plans to double it.[16] In September 2026 Parliament strengthened eSafety's enforcement powers again, including powers to compel documents from platforms and age-assurance providers.[14]

How does a platform prove someone isn't under 16? The government's own Age Assurance Technology Trial, published in August 2025, concluded that age assurance "can be done," with no single solution suitable for every case.[17] Reuters reported that the trial found photo-based age estimation got worse near the age-16 cutoff, with "unacceptable" inaccuracy for some groups.[15] Where estimation fails, the fallback is a document or other proof of identity. The ID-based verification part of the trial tested 24 providers; the best systems had error rates around 3%.[18]

Alongside this, the Digital ID Act 2024 created a national accreditation scheme for digital ID providers, overseen by a Digital ID Regulator since 30 November 2024. Accreditation is voluntary unless a provider wants to join the Australian Government Digital ID System.[19] The trial report itself noted that digital ID could become a route for age assurance.[19] My concern is simple: once every account and every adult search session sits behind an age check, anonymous participation online becomes the exception, not the rule.

4. Social media warrants, known or unknown to the user

Australia's surveillance laws are among the most far-reaching in the Five Eyes.

Decryption and "industry assistance." The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018, known as TOLA, created three tools: voluntary technical assistance requests (TARs), compulsory technical assistance notices (TANs), and technical capability notices (TCNs), which the Attorney-General can use to require a provider to build a new capability.[20][21] Unauthorised disclosure of information about these notices is an offence, so a company served with one generally can't tell its users.[21] In 2024–25, five interception agencies gave providers 58 technical assistance requests; no TANs or TCNs were reported.[22] ASIO reports its own use separately.[23]

Hacking warrants. The Identify and Disrupt Act 2021 added data disruption warrants, network activity warrants and account takeover warrants, which let police take control of a person's online account.[24]

The volume of quiet access. In 2024–25, 2,726 interception warrants were issued to 17 agencies, and 706 stored communications warrants. Enforcement agencies made 364,868 authorisations to access existing telecommunications data, the "metadata" of who called whom, when and where, plus 49,482 authorisations for prospective data. Most data authorisations are made internally by the agencies themselves, not by a judge. One journalist information warrant was issued.[22] [Needs source: the statutory provision on internal authorisation of metadata access.]

What platforms report. In July–December 2025, Meta received 2,996 Australian government requests for user data (2,704 legal process, 292 emergency) covering 4,147 accounts, and produced some data in 85.51% of cases.[25] Google received 3,291 legal requests in the same period, disclosing data in 89% of them and covering 4,865 accounts, plus 50 emergency requests.[26]

Notification. I found no general obligation to tell the person whose account was accessed. [Needs source: confirm whether any Australian regime requires notifying subjects of interception or data access.] In practice, you will almost never know.

5. Government-controlled media: print

Australian newspapers are privately owned. The state's lever over them is money, routed through the platforms.

In 2021 Australia passed the News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code. It lets the government "designate" a digital platform and force it into binding negotiation, with arbitration if necessary, over payments to news businesses.[27] No platform was ever designated; Google and Meta signed voluntary deals instead, which Treasury's review counted at more than 30, estimated to be worth more than A$200 million.[27] In 2024 Meta said it would not renew its Australian news deals.[28] The government responded in December 2024 with the "News Bargaining Incentive": large platforms face a charge, offset by any commercial deals they make with Australian news publishers.[29]

I'm not arguing that newspapers shouldn't be paid for their work. My concern is who decides. Under the code and the incentive, the government decides which platforms must pay, which publishers count as eligible "news businesses," and what happens if a platform refuses. [Needs source: federal government advertising spend in print media.]

6. Government-controlled media: television and radio

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation receives about A$1.23 billion in government funding for 2025–26; SBS receives about A$359 million, supplemented by advertising.[30][31] In late 2024 the government committed to legislating five-year funding terms for both, presented as protection against "political interference."[32]

Appointments. ABC directors are appointed by the Governor-General on the government's recommendation. For new non-executive directors, an independent nomination panel reports at least three candidates. The Prime Minister recommends the chair after consulting the Leader of the Opposition. Reappointments skip the panel process.[33][34] The process is more arms-length than most. But the final choice, and the budget, still sit with the government of the day.

Radio. ABC radio, including its local, national and news networks, is funded from the same appropriation as ABC television.[30] In much of regional Australia, ABC local radio is a primary source of news, which makes its funding relationship with Canberra all the more important. [Needs source: separate ABC radio funding breakdown.]

Licensing and prominence. Commercial broadcasters hold licences regulated by ACMA. [Needs source: ACMA licensing powers, and the status of Australia's proposed prominence framework for connected TVs.]

My view

Australia shows how a democracy can build control without ever calling it that. Search engines must filter results and check ages. Agencies can quietly block websites. A regulator orders content removed, and Meta restricts more content under Australian law than in any other country I looked at. Children are banned from social media, and adults are pushed toward proving who they are. Hundreds of thousands of metadata requests are made each year without a judge, and encryption-assistance powers exist that companies are forbidden to talk about. Meanwhile the main broadcaster is funded by the state. Each measure has a reasonable-sounding purpose. Together, they put the government at the center of what Australians see, say and hear.

Sources

  1. eSafety Commissioner, "Accessing online porn and adult content: FAQs" — https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/codes/faq-access-to-online-porn-and-other-adult-content
  2. eSafety Commissioner, Overview of the Phase 2 Industry Codes (Sep 2025) — https://www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-09/Overview-of-the-Phase-2-Industry-Codes.pdf
  3. ACMA, "Requests to block online services under section 313(3)" — https://www.acma.gov.au/requests-block-online-services-under-section-3133
  4. Australian Government, Guidelines for the use of section 313(3) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (June 2017) — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/australian_government_guidelines_for_use_of_section_313_-_june_2017_0.pdf
  5. ACMA Annual Report 2021–22, Appendix 6: Lawful disruption of access to online services — https://www.transparency.gov.au/publications/communications-and-the-arts/australian-communications-and-media-authority-acma/australian-communications-and-media-authority-annual-report-2021-22/appendixes/appendix-6%3A-lawful-disruption-of-access-to-online-services-by-government-agencies
  6. Google Transparency Report, Government requests to remove content (data download, Jul 2024–Jun 2025) — https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/overview
  7. DITRDCSA, "Current legislation" (online safety) — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/media-technology-communications/internet/online-safety/current-legislation
  8. eSafety Commissioner, statement re Federal Court proceedings (Jun 2024) — https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/media-releases/statement-from-the-esafety-commissioner-re-federal-court-proceedings
  9. eSafety Commissioner, statement on AAT orders (Oct 2024) — https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/media-releases/esafety-statement-administrative-appeals-tribunal-orders
  10. Meta Transparency Center, Content restrictions based on local law: Australia (Jul–Dec 2025 data file) — https://transparency.meta.com/reports/content-restrictions/country/AU/
  11. ACMA, Third report to government on digital platforms' efforts under voluntary arrangements (Sep 2024) — https://www.acma.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-09/ACMA%20third%20report%20to%20government%20on%20digital%20platforms%20efforts%20under%20voluntart%20arrangements_0.pdf
  12. Minister for Communications, statement on the Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation Bill 2024 — https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/rowland/media-release/communications-legislation-amendment-combatting-misinformation-and-disinformation-bill-2024
  13. Parliament of Australia, Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2024 — https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7284
  14. eSafety Commissioner, "Social media age restrictions" — https://www.esafety.gov.au/about-us/industry-regulation/social-media-age-restrictions
  15. Reuters, "Australian report raises concerns over age-verification software ahead of teen social ban" (1 Sep 2025) — https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-report-raises-concerns-over-age-verification-software-ahead-teen-2025-09-01/
  16. BBC News, "Australia to double penalties for platforms in breach of social media ban" — https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c78yv5g74e9o
  17. DITRDCSA, Age Assurance Technology Trial — Final Report (31 Aug 2025) — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/department/media/publications/age-assurance-technology-trial-final-report
  18. Age Assurance Technology Trial, Part C — Age verification — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/aatt_part_c_digital.pdf
  19. Age Assurance Technology Trial, Part K — Glossary, bibliography and literature review (Digital ID) — https://ageassurance.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AATT_Part_K_DIGITAL.pdf
  20. Department of Home Affairs, "Frequently Asked Questions – The Assistance and Access Act" — https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/assistance-access-act-faq.pdf
  21. Assistance and Access Bill 2018 as passed, Schedule 1 — Industry assistance (ParlInfo) — https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=LEGISLATION;id=legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6195_aspassed%2F0001;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr6195_aspassed%2F0000%22
  22. Department of Home Affairs, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Annual Report 2024–25 — https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/telecommunications-interception-and-access-reports/telecommunications-interception-access-act-1979-annual-report-24-25.pdf
  23. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review of the amendments made by the TOLA Act 2018, Ch. 7 "Reporting and Oversight" — https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/Completed_Inquiries_46th_Parliament/AmendmentsTOLAAct2018/Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024428%2F73617
  24. Australian Government response to the INSLM review of the Identify and Disrupt Act 2021 — https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/reports-and-pubs/files/government-response-review-data-disruption-network-activity-account-takeover-powers.pdf
  25. Meta Transparency Center, Government requests for user data: Australia (Jul–Dec 2025) — https://transparency.meta.com/reports/government-data-requests/country/AU/
  26. Google Transparency Report, Global requests for user information (data download, period ending 31 Dec 2025) — https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview
  27. Treasury (Australia), News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code review — https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-11/p2022-343549.pdf
  28. Reuters, "Meta says will no longer pay for traditional news content in Australia, France, Germany" (Mar 2024) — https://www.reuters.com/technology/meta-says-will-no-longer-pay-traditional-news-content-australia-france-germany-2024-03-01/
  29. Treasury Ministers, "Albanese Government to establish News Bargaining Incentive" (Dec 2024) — https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/stephen-jones-2022/media-releases/albanese-government-establish-news-bargaining-incentive
  30. ABC Portfolio Budget Statements 2025–26 — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2025-26_infra_pbs_03_abc.pdf
  31. SBS Additional Estimates Statements 2025–26 — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2025-26_infra_paes_sbs.pdf
  32. Parliamentary Library, "New government supports for the ABC" (Feb 2025) — https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/Research/FlagPost/2025/February/New_government_supports_for_the_ABC
  33. Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983, s.12 (Membership of Board) — https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/abca1983361/s12.html
  34. DITRDCSA, Appointments to the ABC and SBS Boards: the merit-based appointment process — https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/merit-based-appointment-process.pdf

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